We analyze the standard New Keynesian economy adjusted by a financial intermediation sector, heterogenous, imperfect knowledge, and adaptive learning. We consider two groups of agents (i) private agents (households, firms, private banks) and (ii) the central bank who differ in their knowledge and expectations. The monetary-policy transmission is non-trivial in this environment. The interest rate directly affecting the decisions of households and firms is influenced by the private banks expectations, and the monetary policy may get distorted. The basic finding suggests the higher knowledge heterogeneity, the less active monetary policy should be in order to stabilize the economy. This contrasts the standard literature with homogenous knowledge and expectations.
Introduction
The paper's objective is to theoretically investigate the question of whether central bankers should consider private expectations when setting monetary-policy instruments. If they do so, will it lead to an increase in economic stability?
Since private expectations may distort monetary policy actions, we analyze the question of whether private expectations should affect monetary policy decisions.
In standard models, the homogeneity of expectations is assumed, i.e., the private sector and central bank have the same knowledge about the economy structure and form the same expectations. Here the assumption is weakened. We distinguish between expectations formed by the private sector (here households, firms, and banks) and by the central bank. Further, the private and central bank's imperfect and heterogenous knowledge is adaptively updated.
The analysis is conducted in a dynamic general equilibrium model of the New Keynesian form which allows for a banking sector. The banking sector plays an important role in the policy transmission mechanism here.
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of monetary policy in a heterogenous knowledge environment. In the standard model set-up, the economy wide interest rate is predetermined by the central bank. It is predetermined in the sense that it does not bring any uncertainty to private sector decisions. In our model, the interest rate relevant for the inflation and output gap dynamics is determined by the banking sector. The monetary policy still has a stabilizing role, but now it also depends on the banking sector's objectives and beliefs when * The author would like to thank Michal Kejak, Sergey Slobodyan, Kristoffer Nimark, and the participants of CFS Summer School 2005 for their helpful comments and suggestions. The author would also like to thank Robin-Eliece Mercury for her editing assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
determining interest rates. This makes the policy transmission mechanism nontrivial, and, if the central bank does not know the transmission mechanism, it may cause policy inefficiency and possibly economic instability.
In the environment outlined above we address the following questions:
Should private forecasts concern policy makers?
Given the heterogeneity of expectations in the model, should private expectations enter the policy rule or should the policy rule be based primarily on the central bank's beliefs? What are the implications for economic stability?
2. In the heterogenous knowledge environment, should the central bank be more inflation averse or output gap averse? Orphanides & Williams (2003) and Ferrero (2003) tend to favor inflation vigilance. It lowers economic variability and speeds up the convergence towards the rational expectations equilibrium. Both results are, however, derived for the homogenous expectations case. We reinvestigate this problem in a richer model and under heterogenous expectations.
Does it matter who has better knowledge?
On one hand, there are central banks employing sophisticated techniques to analyze the economy and to forecast a possible future development. On the other hand, there are private agents using less sophisticated techniques to produce their own forecasts. We analyze the situation in which a central bank ignores private forecasts and bases its policy primarily on its own forecasts. We asses the impact on the economic variability from the perspective of a knowledge imperfection, eg.
is the economy less volatile if the central bank has 'better' knowledge than private agents? The concept of knowledge in this paper is defined below.
A New Keynesian model is the typical environment for studying policy issues under learning. In this paper, we derive from first principles a new model which also explicitly includes a banking sector. Extending the standard model structure for a credit channel yields a direct impact of monetary policy on inflation. Since, firms borrow money from banks, the interest paid for the credit becomes the part of firms' costs and because the firms have the power to set their output prices, the interest rate influences prices and inflation. This does not occur in the standard setup. The introduction of the banking sector is originally motivated by Fuerst (1992) . Ravenna & Walsh (2003) use his approach in the context of the New Keynesian model.
For simulation purposes, the perpetual learning concept as employed in Orphanides & Williams (2003) , will be adopted here. The paper by Orphanides & Williams (2003) is one of the first that investigates the impact of imperfect knowledge and perpetual adaptive learning on macroeconomic dynamics and the conduct of optimal monetary policy. The authors find two basic results: (i) "policies that would be efficient under rational expectations can perform poorly when knowledge is imperfect", Orphanides and Williams (2003, p.26) , and (ii) "policy should respond more aggressively to inflation under imperfect knowledge than under perfect knowledge... in order to anchor inflation expectations and foster macroeconomic stability", Orphanides and Williams (2003, p.26) .
The results are obtained with a very basic model consisting of the Lucas supply curve and a simple inflation targeting rule. In the light of the simplicity of the model, Evans (2003) answers the second result above in doubt. For him, there is no clear answer whether the policy maker should be biased towards inflation vigilance under imperfect knowledge. However though the answer might be ambiguous, it
has not yet been provided, and we try to provide it here. provide a review and extension of the recent work on monetary policy under learning. They also investigate, among other items, the consequences of different beliefs between private agents and policy-makers about the true economy structure. They show that certain policy rules allow for Estability and determinacy, even if the beliefs of private agents and the central bank differ. E-stability and determinacy also exist if the cental bank adopts the private agents' beliefs when setting its instruments. The same result is found in Bullard & Mitra (2002) .
The authors use the concept of (finite-horizon) Euler-equation learning. Preston (2004) has addressed the problem from the perspective of infinite learning and produced different results. In Preston's approach, if both agents and policy-makers are learning about the model structure, and the central bank adopts the private agents expectations for its decisions without how they are formed, than it may result in a self-fulfilling expectation problem and macroeconomic instability. Preston argues in favor of policy rules based on the bank's own forecasts. Honkapohja, Mitra & Evans (2003) show that the approach of infinite learning in Preston (2004) does not invalidate results based on the Euler equation learning and demonstrate that Preston's approach can be replicated under plausible assumptions in the Euler-equation learning approach. In this paper we adopt the latter.
The rest of this paper is structured in the following way. In the next section, a general equilibrium model with a financial intermediation sector and a sticky prices phenomenon is derived. The model dynamics is aggregated and represented by the IS and the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In section 3, we introduce the concept of imperfect and heterogenous knowledge, and the model determinacy and E-stability properties are examined. We simulate the model for different numerical specifications and present the results in section 4. Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes.
The Model
The workhorse model follows the standard New Keynesian DSGE schema. On the one hand, there are households who make decisions about consumption, labour, and money holdings in order to maximize and smooth their lifetime welfare. On the other hand, there is a monopolistically competitive production sector that maximizes profits by controlling output, output prices and labour demand. The central bank's objective is characterized by a forward-looking inflation targeting rule which seeks to anchor the nominal side of the economy.
Borrowing from the RBC literature, we extend otherwise the purely New Keynesian model by the sector of financial intermediation. Following Fuerst (1992) , we introduce a financial sector with two frictions. First, all purchases (labour, consumption goods) have to be paid by cash. Second, decisions about cash-money holdings are made prior to an exogenous shocks realization. In the RBC literature such a financial structure helps an RBC model to capture the liquidity effect observed in the data. To make the liquidity effect persistent though, an additional friction has to be introduced. Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992) and Gust & Christiano (1999) generate the persistent liquidity effect by making the financial sector more liquid than the consumption sector, imposing costs on household's financial portfolio adjustments.
We introduce the credit sector to the New Keynesian set-up to make the model structure more plausible. The standard New Keynesian model usually omits financial intermediation which in reality plays a considerable role in monetary transmission. This is not an original idea. Ravenna & Walsh (2003) analyzed optimal monetary policy in such a model. We use the same model to analyze its properties under imperfect, heterogenous knowledge and adaptive learning.
The linearized model characterizing the aggregate economic dynamics is given by the IS curve (1), Phillips curve (2), private banks' pricing rules (3), (4), and the central bank's policy rule (5). In the perfect-knowledge environment, the aggregated sticky-price model takes the form
The model differs from the standard New Keynesian schema in one aspect. As the firms face the credit-in-advance constraint, the interest rate does have a direct impact on inflation since it is a part of the costs the firm has to pay on labour. It is in contrast to the usual setup where only the IS curve is a function of the interest rate. In this model, due to the cost channel, monetary policy has a direct effect not only on the output gap but also on the inflation rate. The derivation of the model is presented in Appendix A on page 27.
The model (1)-(5) assumes all economic agents have perfect knowledge about the economy structure and all expectations operators E t (.) = E t (.|Ω t ) stand for the perfect knowledge rational expectations. In our analysis, the assumption that the complete information set Ω t is available to all agents is relaxed. Instead, we will assume agents have imperfect and heterogenous knowledge which will affect the way agents form their expectations. We will consider two groups of agents:
(i) private agents -households, firms, private banks, and (ii) the central bank. In the following analysis it will be distinguished between the expectation operators which these two groups form. We will assume expectations' homogeneity within each group but heterogeneity between the groups, that is all households, firms and private banks will share the same set of information and beliefs, but, it differs from the information set and beliefs of the central bank. This is a significant relaxation of the original, homogenous, perfect knowledge set-up.
Consequently, the workhorse model for this paper takes the form
where it is specifically distinguished for the form of expectations formed by private
, and by the central bankÊ
where show that the move from the perfect knowledge model to the imperfect and heterogenous knowledge model is possible under the so called Euler-equation learning. If all agents are adaptively learning (using recursive least squares), the originally heterogenous knowledge Ω P t Ω CB t enriches over time so that it converges to the perfect knowledge set Ω t .
Model Analysis Under Adaptive Learning
Besides the imperfect knowledge and heterogeneity between the private agents' and central bank's expectations, we also assume agents are adaptively learning, i.e., they are improving their knowledge about the economy over time, and upon the past mistakes they made in the anticipation of economic movements. Under certain conditions, if all agents are improving their knowledge over time, the economy converges to the perfect knowledge case eventually. In this light the perfect knowledge case, the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), is a special case of an imperfect knowledge environment.
As will be shown below, the minimum-state representation to the structural model (6)- (8) is
where Y t is the vector of endogenous variables, s t is the vector of exogenous shocks, and {a, b, c} are the matrices of the structural parameters.
If we say the agents have imperfect and heterogenous knowledge, we assume the agents' perception of the economy does not correspond to the perfect knowledge case and further, the knowledge differs between the agents. It is assumed the private agents' perceived law of motion (PLM) for the economy (6)- (8) The mechanism is formalized
where i = {P, CB}, ξ (6)- (8) differ in their knowledge of the structural parameters, and in the speed of updating their knowledge. The individual information sets are defined as
To analyze the conditions under which the imperfect knowledge model (6)- (10) converges to the REE equilibrium, the methodology developed by Evans & Honkapohja (2001) is employed. In principle the methodology consists of two parts. First, the rational expectation equilibrium of a given model is examined.
We look for conditions under which the REE is determined. The REE equilibrium is called to be determined if it is found unique and stabile. The second part of the methodology is the check for the learnability of REE. The question is, if the economic agents have imperfect knowledge, can they learn, given a learning mechanism, the true RE dynamics? Throughout the paper the recursive, least-squares (econometric) learning mechanism (34)- (35) is considered. The conditions that guarantee the REE is attainable under the adaptive learning mechanism are called the E-stability conditions. For technical details on the methodology we refer to Evans & Honkapohja (2001) and where the adaptive learning in a homogenous environment is examined and to for the methodology on heterogenous learning.
REE Determinacy
To examine the rational expectation equilibrium of the model (6)- (8) we begin with rewriting the model into a matrix structural form:
where
The properties of u t and v t determine s t so that it follows an AR(1) process s t = F s t−1 + w t , where
The reduced form to the structural model (36) is
To analyze the REE determinacy, we will assume for now a perfect knowledge environment,Ê P t (.) =Ê
CB
Given that and rearranging the reduced form one obtains
.
Proposition 1. The model (6)-(8) has a unique and stabile rational expectations equilibrium if the modulus of the eigenvalues of matrix M in (38) lies inside the unit circle.
Proof follows from the properties of the stable FODE system.
E-Stability
The second issue is to analyze the conditions under which the REE is learnable. We will follow the methodology by for the heterogenous adaptive learning based on recursive least squares. If the REE is determined, the model has the minimum state variable (MSV) representation
a, b, and c are the (3x1) and (3x3) matrices of the model primitives. Their exact form is derived in Appendix B on page 38.
Next suppose, the agents have the following perceived law of motion (PLM).
The private agents' PLM is
and of the central bank's PLM
The subscript t at matrices indicates the time dependence of the matrices as the agents are learning using (9)-(10). The private agents and central bank use their
PLMs to form expectationŝ
Substituting (17)- (19) back to the reduced form (12), one obtains the economy's actual law of motion
The mapping from PLM to ALM is formalized to
The E-stability is determined by the differential equation
Evans & Honkapohja (2001) prove the E-stability exists if (22) is locally stable.
Honkapohja & Mitra (2003) and show the map (21) can be simplified. They show the E-stability conditions in the case of heterogenous expectations are equivalent (under least squares learning) to the homogenous expectations case. Thus (46), assumingĵ
Proposition 2. The REE of the model (6)- (10) 
must lie inside the unit circle.
Proof see for the proof of the first statement and Appendix C on page 40 for the derivation of DT a (a), DT b (b), and DT c (c).
Numerical Evaluation of the Conditions
Since M is a (3x3) matrix, it is easier to evaluate the REE determinacy and Estability conditions numerically. Ravenna & Walsh (2003) estimate the model (6)- (8) From the graphical evaluation of the conditions it follows, the central bank has a considerably limited manoeuvering space for setting its policy rule. The model without a banking sector implies the central bank has the option to set its θ π and θ x in the ranges of (1, 12) and (0, 0.5), respectively.
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In the model with the banking sector this is already considerably less. To impose determinacy and E-stability, θ π and θ x must be within (1, 3.5) and 0.1, 0.5), respectively. In this light the calibration of policy rule (8) where θ π = 1.5 and θ x = 0.5, often used in the literature, puts the model equilibrium on the edge of determinacy and E-stability. In simulations below we choose θ x = 0.4 to be within the E-stability and determinacy region.
Model simulation
In this section, we focus on the two research questions asked in the introductory In Table 1 we can observe the following patterns. 
Inflation or output gap hawkiness?
Now we evaluate the results in Table 1 and 3 from the perspective of monetary policy setting.
θ π = 1.5 and θ x = 0.4 is the policy configuration which delivers the lowest implied economic variability for all states of knowledge in the economy. This will be our benchmark. If the policy is tougher on inflation (θ π = 2 and θ x = 0.4), the economic variability implied by learning increases. In the case where private agents have worse knowledge than the central bank (Table 1 , κ P = 0.1), the variability even doubles. In Table 3 , the increase is not as significant.
When the policy is less focused on the output gap stabilization, i.e., θ π = 1.5 and θ x = 0.2, it yields considerably higher variability, with respect to the benchmark case, and the private agents having worse knowledge than the central bank (Table   1 , κ P = 0.1). The variability is about the same when the situation is reverse (Table   3 , κ CB = 0.1).
When the central bank prefers inflation stabilization over the output gap stabilization, i.e., θ π = 2 and θ x = 0.2, there are some gains and the variability lowers in comparison to the benchmark in Table 1 . In Table 3 , where the private agents have better knowledge than the central bank, the result is reverse, i.e., the variability increases with a tougher policy on inflation.
To sum up, the policy configuration θ π = 1.5 and θ x = 0.4 is robust and delivers the lowest economic variability implied by the learning process. A different policy setting does not seem to deliver better results. There is no evidence the central bank ought to prefer to be inflation hawk to the output gap hawk. It is common for both cases though, when θ π = 1.5 or 2, to be less output gap averse which increases the variability.
Summary and Conclusion
In recent years, one can observe a rising interest of economists in the question of optimal monetary policy in an imperfect and heterogenous knowledge environment.
The central question asked in this paper 'Should private expectations concern central bankers?' is common to most of the literature. Here, the question has been reviewed form a slightly different perspective.
Borrowing from the RBC literature, we have extended the standard New Keynesian for a financial intermediation sector which in reality plays an important role in policy transmission. In the theory, it is often omitted. Since, in the model, results suggest the policy ought not to be hawkish neither towards inflation nor the output gap. Since it leads to a higher implied economic variability, it prolongs the learning process of REE and potentially may lead to an instability (depending on the knowledge heterogenity magnitude). For the central bank to play its role effectively in the heterogenous information world and help the economy converge to the first best equilibrium, it ought to be conservative in its actions and focus its policy on the information and knowledge homogenization in the economy.
In principle, there are two possibilities to do this. First, the central bank can adopt, in its policy function, expectations of the private sector. This is the simplest way. This, however, brings the requirement the central bank is able to observe 
Appendix A
In this appendix we derive the model (1)-(5) from first principles.
Agents
Households The households' objective is to maximize lifetime utility. The consumption bundle, c t , and leisure, (1 − N t ) , deliver the utility. To meet the objective, a household does not only decide about how much to consume and how much to work, but it also decides about how much money to hold, since money is the means of transaction in this economy and serves the consumption-smoothing purposes. Households face two constraints in their decisions. First, following Fuerst (1992), they need to hold cash in advance in order to purchase consumption goods. 
subject to
Here c t represents the CES composite index (Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator) of real con- 
Setting up the Lagrangian function
and maximizing it gives a set of first order conditions
Combining (28), and (29) gives the Euler equation for the household's labour supply
Combining (28), (30) and (31) gives the Euler equation for consumption
Having the relation for the aggregate consumption, we also have to solve for the individual demand for differentiated goods c t (i). Here the household solves
subject to the budget constraint
where P t c t are the expenditures on the consumption bundle c t , and P t (i) is the price of an individual good. Solution to this problem is the individual good demand
In summary, constraints (25)-(27) and equations (32),(33), and (36) describe the household's optimal decisions.
Firms Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment. As such, to maximize their profits, they choose how much to produce, what price to charge, and how much labour to demand. Following the timing in Fuerst (1992) , management's decisions are taken after the shocks to the economy are realized. We assume labour is the only production factor. To start production, a firm goes to the labour market to hire workers. Once the output is produced, the labour is paid out. The firm goes to a bank and applies for a credit to cover the wage bill. When the revenues from selling the output are collected, the firm re-pays the credit and transfers its net financial position to households.
Each firm, distinguished as an i firm, produces one type of good and solves the following problem
is the firm's i nominal profit and Φ t+1 is the stochastic discount factor defined as β t+1 /(c t+1 P t+1 ).
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N t (i) is the labour demanded by the firm i, P t (i) is the firm-specific price charged on the output y t (i), B t (i) is the demand for credit, and i b t is the interest rate paid for the credit. Note that the firm's problem is in fact static and thus the firm maximizes only Π f t (i) subject to
(38) is the firm's production function where labour is the only production factor.
The technology associated to the labour is captured by
is the aggregate technology shock, ν A t is iid, zero mean and finite variance disturbance, 0 < ρ A < 1. (39) is the demand function for the consumption good c t (i) the firm produces. The firm also faces a cash-in-advance constraint (40) which requires to pay wages in advance, i.e., after the output was produced but before it is sold.
Since in equilibrium (40) holds with equality, we substitute all the constraints into the profit function and suitably rearrange to obtain
The first order condition follows
Rearranging it and using constraints (38)- (40) gives a set of conditions characterizing the optimal behavior of the i'th firm:
M C t are the firm's nominal marginal costs,
. (41) is the standard pricing rule in the monopolistic competition. The price is a fixed markup over marginal costs, (42) is the labour demand, and (43) constitutes the credit demand function. Note that these conditions characterize the firm's optimal behavior in a frictionless environment.
To introduce a persistence into the prices in the model, Calvo's pricing scheme is assumed. The production sector is monopolistically competitive and as such has control over prices. Calvo's pricing mechanism assumes that in every period only a fraction of firms, θ ∈ (0, 1), can adjust its price. The rest of the firms, (1 − θ), charge the same price as in the previous period. θ is often viewed as a pricestickiness measure. The higher its value, the higher the degree of price persistence.
Since the pricing mechanism is well known and described in the literature, we will limit ourselves to its optimal solution.
Introducing Calvo's pricing mechanism, the firm's problem is no longer a static one. If a firm i is allowed to change price in period t, it chooses to charge the optimal price
which is the discounted sum of the future expected marginal cost. Since we are in a monopolistically competitive environment, note that the marginal cost here meets the first order condition (41). This specification fully corresponds to the one employed in Gali & Gertler (1999) . β is the subjective discount factor from the households problem. In this specification, the firm takes into account the possibility it might not be allowed to change the price for some time from now on.
Introducing the price persistence in the economy, the set of conditions (41)- (43) characterizing the firm's optimal behavior in a monopolistically competitive environment is extended by the time dependent Calvo pricing rule (44). The firm applies it only if it wins the lottery and is allowed to change the price. Otherwise the firm charges the same price as in the previous period.
At this point, it is useful to determine the aggregate price level since later we will be particularly interested in the aggregate dynamics. As stated above, the aggregate price level is computed as
The aggregate level in the sticky-price environment is a weighted average of past prices and new prices. The weights are given by the portion of firms allowed to change the prices. The aggregate price level becomes
In summary, in the frictionless environment, the optimal behavior of firm is given by equations (41)- (43). If the Calvo pricing rule is introduced, (44) also applies. It is employed if the firm is allowed to change its price. Otherwise, it charges the price from the last period.
Banking Sector The role of the competitive banking sector is two-fold. First, to collect deposits from households and, second, to provide credit to firms. The operation schedule of the private bank is as follows. The bank enters the period t with the deposit money from the households. The only money source in the economy is the central bank. Once the shocks to the economy are realized, and the central bank makes its decision about the policy rate, and firms decide on their production and credit demand, the private bank goes to the central bank and (i) puts the collected deposit money into its accounts and (ii) asks for a credit to cover the firms' demand. The central bank charges the same interest rate on both the deposit money and credit.
Households visit a bank before exogenous shocks are realized, i.e., at the end of period t − 1. A private bank collects deposits and puts them on interest-bearing accounts at the central bank. As the central bank sets its rates after shocks are realized and the private bank has to sign contracts before that, the private bank has to form expectations about the central bank's future rate. From the perfect competition and zero profit condition it follows that the private bank sets its price
where i b t is the interest rate charged on the credit provided to the firms, and i d t is the interest rate offered on deposits.
Monetary Authority The monetary policy, in order to anchor the nominal side of the economy, is assumed to follow the targeting rule (48) is twofold. First, the choice is motivated by the empirical evidence by Clarida et al. (2000) who argue for this type of rule.
Second, Bullard & Mitra (2002) find that this type of rule is robust to deliver the rational expectations equilibrium determinacy and E-stability, which is required for the analysis below.
Model Equilibrium
Definition 2. The flexible-price equilibrium is given by an allocation
such that 1. households maximize their lifetime welfare (24) subject to constraints (25)- (37) constrained by (39)- (40), and Calvo's pricing principle allows the firm to set an optimal price according to (44) if it is allowed to change its price, otherwise
3. perfect competitive private banks maximize their profit;
4. central bank meets its inflation target and zero-output-gap objectives; and 5. labour market, money market, and goods market clear.
Log-Linearized Model and Aggregate Equilibrium
From now on we focus our attention particularly on the aggregate dynamics. We log-linearize the sticky-price model and describe its aggregate-level dynamics. Because we concentrate specifically on the dynamics of output and inflation, we concentrate on the IS and Phillips curves.
First we derive the IS curve which characterizes the dynamics of output around its steady state. The derivation is straightforward and follows the same strategy as Ravenna & Walsh (2003) and Malik (2004) . We log-linearize the Euler equation from the household's problem (33) to get
where mc t is the log of real marginal costs. To eliminate the marginal costs, we plug in (41) to (42) and divide both sides by P t ; we obtain the real marginal costs.
Log-linearizing that under the perfect knowledge assumption gives
Substituting in (52) for the log-linearized labor supply function (32), gives 
Now assume the MSV form takes the form
Taking the appropriate expectations needed in (54) one obtains
Plugging these expectations back into (54) yields
Using the method of undetermined coefficients, it follows that the MSV solution must satisfy
Solving for the matrices a, b, and c we get
Appendix D 
The REE Model Dynamics
Given the numerical calibration, we simulate the impulse response function for the standard New Keynesian model and for the credit channel extension. The impulse responses to the productivity and demand shocks are summarized in Figure 3 . In Table ,3 we report on the moments, correlation and autocorrelation of the simulated variables. The numbers are obtained for 5,000 replications. The economy with the credit channel opened is less responsive to the exogenous shocks than the economy where the channel is closed. The only exception is the response of output gap to the technology shock, which is about as twice as big in contrast to the no-credit market economy. Surprisingly, the credit channel does not affect the persistence of any model variable. Indeed, this holds only ceteris paribus.
A detailed investigation on the model properties we leave for future research. 
